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Abstract
Investor-state contracts are regularly used in low- and middle-income countries to grant
concessions for land-based investments, such as agricultural or forestry projects. These contracts
are rarely negotiated in the presence of, or with meaningful input from, the people who risk being
adversely affected by the project. This has serious implications for requirements for meaningful
consultation, and, where applicable, free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC), and is particularly
important in situations in which investor-state contracts grant the investor rights to lands or
resources over which the community has legitimate claims.
The paper explores how consultation and FPIC processes can be integrated into investor-state
contract negotiations, taking into account the practicalities of contract negotiations, to better
safeguard the land rights and human rights of members of project-affected communities. Based
on a review of relevant international law standards and guidance documents, as well as a close
analysis of typical investor-state negotiations and of consultation and consent processes in other
contexts, the paper provides various options that may be appropriate, depending on the local
context and the community’s resources and decision-making structures.
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Introduction
In many places, natural resource investments that involve concessions or leases for large swathes
of land can pose significant threats to the land rights and human rights of local communities and
their members. International law and guidance documents require meaningful consultation with,
and in some cases the free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) of, project-affected communities,
and much work has been done to articulate how this can be implemented in practice. Yet one
area that is less explored is whether, and if so how, FPIC and consultation processes can be built
into negotiations of the investor-state contracts that grant concessions or lease land to investors.1
Investor-state contracts are regularly used in low- and middle-income countries to grant
concessions or provide leases for natural resource investments, including agricultural, forestry,
and extractive industry projects. These contracts, which are negotiated between host
governments and investors, typically allocate rights to access and develop land and/or resources
for the investment project, in exchange for revenue (through land rents, taxes, and other fees)
and other potential benefits to the host government. They are rarely negotiated in the presence of,
or with meaningful input from, the people who risk being adversely affected by the project,
including those with legitimate claims to the lands or resources underlying the project. In such
scenarios, requirements for meaningful consultation and, where applicable, FPIC—whether
under international law, domestic law, or industry or finance-related standards—will often not be
satisfied.
In other cases, domestic laws may require investors seeking access to land or resources to
negotiate directly with community representatives or local authorities, rather than with the host
government. This is more common for agricultural and forestry concessions than for extractive
projects, as governments usually retain rights to sub-surface minerals under domestic law.
Scenarios where investors must negotiate directly with community representatives or local
authorities are outside the scope of this paper. That said, it should not be taken for granted that
government obligations to ensure that community members have been consulted or, where
relevant, have provided their FPIC to any transaction merely because a chief or other community
representative or local authority was a party. On the contrary, such negotiations can concentrate
power into the hands of local leaders who may not always be incentivized to act in the interests
of the community, or to ensure the community remains abreast of developments and has
1

This paper also uses the term ‘companies’ to refer to investors who seek to establish, or actually carry out, a
natural resource project in a host country.
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provided its consent to proceed. In such cases there should therefore be a concerted effort to
ensure that community members are adequately consulted and, where relevant, have provided
their consent.
Of course, respect for FPIC goes far beyond simply inserting consent processes into an
anticipated or ongoing negotiation between a host government and investor. FPIC, distilled to its
essence, is about the right of indigenous people, and at times other communities, to decide for
themselves how their lands and resources are used. To the extent that FPIC is required,
communities must have far greater say in such decisions, including before the government
decides on, or grants any authorizations for, a proposed investment project. Similarly, for
consultation to be meaningful, communities must have the opportunity to shape decision-making
on projects that will affect them. This, too, requires more than simply meeting with communities
to discuss a proposed project in general terms, and should allow sufficient time for community
perspectives to be incorporated into any decision-making regarding the proposed project. This
paper thus considers consultation and FPIC processes tied to contract negotiations as
mechanisms for continuing to ensure respect for rights to meaningful consultation and to FPIC,
which require iterative and evolving processes; it does not advocate for such processes being the
first or only opportunity for community input into decision-making.
After a spike in the negotiation of land deals for agricultural projects in the last decade, the
“global rush for land” appears to be slowing—with a decrease in the reported number of
investment contracts concluded between investors and host governments each year—though not
stopping.2 Development of new projects in the extractive industries also slowed in response to
the dramatic drops in commodities prices that began midway through 2014, following the
“commodity supercycle”.3 This creates a window of opportunity for developing better
consultation and FPIC practices in relation to investment contract negotiations between investors
and governments, by ensuring that communities whose lands or resources risk being affected are
informed, and have the opportunity to participate in and influence decision-making regarding
such negotiations. This paper does not endorse investment contracts as an optimal means of
regulating resource investments; rather, it acknowledges the prevalence of such contracts in
Kerstin Nolte et al, International Land Deals for Agriculture: Fresh insights from the Land Matrix: Analytical Report II (2016),
12.
3 Lisa Sachs and Nicolas Maennling, “Resource Resilience: How to Break the Commodities Cycle,” World Politics
Review (2015), http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/15848/resource-resilience-how-to-break-thecommodities-cycle; Thomas Lassourd and David Manley, “Guest post: 10 consequences of the commodity crash,”
beyondbrics (2015).
2
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current practices, and the need to ensure that governments comply with their consultation and
FPIC obligations at the contract negotiation stage for as long as such contracts regulate such
investments.
This paper is intended to assist stakeholders involved in or affected by natural resource
investments, including project-affected communities, investors, and host governments, as well as
civil society organizations and other actors working to make such investments more responsible.
It seeks to have a practical impact by articulating options for consultation and FPIC processes
that can be built into investment contract negotiations, and in analyzing their feasibility and the
degree to which they allow for communities to be informed and to meaningfully participate in
and influence contract negotiations. Underlying the consideration of these options is an
assumption that current levels of community involvement at this stage are usually inadequate, and
that, as mentioned above, community participation at the contract negotiation stage cannot
constitute the earliest or full extent of consultation and FPIC processes that a government must
carry out.
The paper starts by examining international standards and best practices for ensuring that
communities are informed and can participate in and influence decision-making regarding
resource investments, as well as the steps that some communities have taken in practice to
organize and democratize decision-making around land and resource use. It then considers
investment contract negotiation processes, which generally lack adequate community
involvement, and potential community motivations for more direct involvement in those
negotiations. After underlining factors that affect the feasibility of greater inclusion of community
perspectives, the paper then sets out three options for community participation in what have
typically been investor-state negotiations, considering the opportunities and challenges of each
option in ensuring an inclusive and participatory negotiation process.

Consultation and FPIC – in standards and in practice
Rights underpinning the need for consultation
Human rights principles set out various entitlements to information and participation for
communities who may potentially be affected by a natural resource investment. These and other
rights can be interpreted as requiring governments to meaningfully consult with such
communities. Key elements of consultation for communities in the context of a natural resource
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project that risks affecting them include: having access to all relevant information regarding the
project in a understandable format; having the opportunity to deliberate internally and
communicate community priorities to the government and investor; and being able to participate
in and influence relevant decisions regarding the project to the extent that such decisions will
affect the community’s rights or lands or resources.
All community members have a right to information; this is found in the protection of freedom
of expression, which includes the freedom to seek and receive information.4 The Inter-American
Court of Human Rights has held that this right establishes a positive obligation on states to
provide information of public interest upon request,5 which can include information regarding
foreign investment contracts.6 In the context of a natural resource investment, the right to
information may cover information regarding the project’s impacts on the environment,7 the
fulfillment of mandates by public bodies concerned with investment,8 and the project’s health
impacts.9
Potentially affected communities also have a right to take part in public affairs,10 which under the
International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination extends
beyond voting and standing for election to include participation of ethnic minorities in “the
conduct of public affairs at any level.”11 The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, while
not a source of binding jurisprudence, has interpreted the right to take part in public affairs as
including entitlements “to be fully involved in and to effectively influence public decision-making
processes that affect them,”12 and “to be consulted and to be provided with equal and effective

ICCPR, art 19.2.
Case of Claude Reyes v. Chile, 2006 Inter-American Court of Human Rights (ser. C) No. 151, 19, September 2006, 41
(applying Art 9(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights, which uses identical language, namely that “Every
individual shall have the right to receive information”).
6 Case of Claude Reyes v. Chile, supra, para. 73.
7 Case of Claude Reyes v. Chile, supra, para. 73; Mrs Fatma Zohra Ksentini, Special Rapporteur to the Commission on
Human Rights, Human Rights and The Environment, 6 July 1994, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9, paras. 180, 203-216.
8 Case of Claude Reyes v. Chile, supra, para. 73.
9 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 14 on the Right to Health, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2000/4 (2000), paras. 8, 11, 44.
10 ICCPR, art. 25. For a more detailed discussion of this right as it applies to transparency in land investments see
Jesse Coleman and Kaitlin Cordes, Articulating a Rights-Based Argument for Land Contract Transparency (forthcoming),
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/work/projects/transparency-in-land-based-investment/.
11 International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 5(c).
12 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Promotion, protection and implementation of the
right to participate in public affairs in the context of the existing human rights law: best practices, experiences, challenges and ways to
overcome them (2015) UN Doc. A/HRC/30/26, para. 9.
4
5
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opportunities to be involved in decision-making processes on all matters of public concern.”13
The Inter-American Court has also upheld rights of communities with a “special relationship” to
the land, such as those who draw spiritual or cultural importance from the land, to effectively
participate in decisions affecting their lands and resources.14

FPIC requirements
The FPIC requirement features many of the elements discussed under consultation, above, while
also places additional control in the hands of relevant communities by focusing on the provision
of the community’s consent. This element can change power dynamics with governments or
investors, increasing the community’s bargaining power. Requiring governments to obtain a
community’s consent also encourages consultations to be conducted with a view to reaching
consensus, which can help to ensure consultations are meaningful, and that community
perspectives are actually incorporated into proposals regarding project design.
Governments’ legal obligations regarding FPIC often extend far beyond what is commonly
acknowledged by governments themselves. Obligations to obtain the FPIC of indigenous and
tribal communities in the context of projects that stand to affect their access to lands, territories
and resources are contained in various treaties and guidelines. The consent requirement for
governments contemplating relocation of an indigenous people in the ILO’s Convention
concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries15 is the only legally binding
international treaty provision that explicitly discusses consent as it may apply in the context of
natural resource-based investments. However, most states have ratified at least one, and often
many more, treaties that have been authoritatively interpreted to require FPIC. These include the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,16 the American Convention on Human
Rights,17 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights,18 among other treaties. Rights

Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on Factors that impede equal political participation and
steps to overcome those challenges (2014) UN Doc. A/HRC/27/29, para. 89.
14 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Judgment of June 15, 2005,
paras. 131-134; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgment of
November 28, 2007, paras. 82-86.
15 International Labour Organization, Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (“ILO
C169”), June 27, 1989, 1650 U.N.T.S 383, Art 16(2). The article goes on to set out alternative requirements for when
such consent cannot be obtained.
16 Ángela Poma Poma v. Peru, Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 1457/2006, 27 March 2009, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006, para. 7.6.
17 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, (Ser. C) No. 172, Judgment of
November 28, 2007, para. 129.
13
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that have been regarded as forming a basis for FPIC include minority rights to enjoy culture,19
freedom of religion,20 and rights to self-determination,21 property and resources,22 and
development,23 among others. The United Nations’ Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights and Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination have also recommended that
consent processes apply in the context of non-indigenous communities, including “local
communities,”24 “ethnic groups,”25 “afro-Colombian people,”26 and “vulnerable communities,
including pastoralist and hunter-gatherer communities.”27 FPIC requirements for any project
affecting an indigenous people’s lands, territories or other resources are also contained in the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which is not technically
binding, but is regarded as synthesizing various customary international law principles; similar
FPIC requirements are echoed by the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of
Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests (“Voluntary Guidelines”),28 another soft law document.
How FPIC is implemented in practice will vary from case to case, but some core components are
required. The government is obligated to engage directly with the community through the
community’s own representative decision-making structures, and to make good faith efforts to
reach agreement on just terms.29 The government must also find ways to mitigate power
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 276/03 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and
Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, para. 291 (May 2009).
19 Ángela Poma Poma v. Peru, supra, para. 7.7; Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group
International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, supra, para. 251.
20 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v.
Kenya, supra, para. 173.
21 International Law Association, Resolution No. 5/2012: Rights of Indigenous Peoples, section I, para. 5 (concluding that
states are obliged by “customary and applicable convention international law” to ensure FPIC and the rights to
participation and consultation as a prerogative of the obligation to recognize and promote the right of indigenous
peoples to autonomy or self-government); Cathal Doyle and Jill Cariño, Making Free, Prior & Informed Consent a Reality,
Indigenous Peoples and the Extractive Sector (2013), http://www.ecojesuit.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/MakingFPIC-a-Reality-Report.pdf; Emily Greenspan, Free, Prior, and Informed Consent in Africa: An emerging standard for extractive
industry projects (2014), 5.
22 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v.
Kenya, supra, paras. 162, 238, 268, 291.
23 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v.
Kenya, supra, paras. 291, 298.
24 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations - Mexico, UN Doc.
E/C.12/MEX/CO/4, June 9, 2006, para. 28.
25 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under
Article 9 of the Convention, Concluding Observations - Lao People's Democratic Republic, UN Doc. CERD/C/LAO/CO/15,
April 18, 2005, para. 18.
26 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations - Colombia, UN Doc.
E/C.12/COL/CO/, June 7, 2010, para. 9.
27 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations on the initial to 3rd reports of the United
Republic of Tanzania, UN Doc. E/C.12/TZA/CO/1-3, December 13, 2012, para. 22.
28 U.N.G.A. Res. 61/295, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) (“UNDRIP”), Art 32(2).
29 Report of the International Workshop on Methodologies Regarding Free Prior and Informed Consent, UN Doc. E/C.19/2005/3,
endorsed by the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (2005), para. 47; James Anaya and Sergio Puig,
18
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imbalances between the community and other actors, such as investors, to ensure that any
consent obtained is “free” from coercion or manipulation.30 Consultation and consent processes
must be conducted sufficiently “prior” to the granting of authorizations and the commencement
of the project, with relevant information regarding the project provided in an accessible format
so that the community is “informed.”31 For the FPIC standard to be met, the government must
also obtain the community’s “consent.” The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, regional
human rights commissions, and United Nations experts have found that proceeding with a
project where consent was not provided32 breached the FPIC standard.33
While governments are the primary duty-bearers of obligations under international human rights
law, businesses have responsibilities to respect human rights, which includes respect for FPIC
rights. More generally, soft law instruments like the UN Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights (UNGPs) set out the need for strong human rights due diligence and consultation
processes.34 The Principles for Responsible Contracts, annexed to the UNGPs, also emphasize
the need for an “effective community engagement plan through [the project’s] life cycle.”35
Outside of explicit human rights frameworks, businesses have increasingly embraced
commitments to FPIC, both through certifications schemes and through specific company
policies. These FPIC commitments often apply to all local communities. For example, the Forest
Stewardship Council’s International Standard36 and the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil’s

Mitigating State Sovereignty: The Duty to Consult with Indigenous Peoples | Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 16-42
(2016), 23-24.
30 Report of the International Workshop on Methodologies Regarding Free Prior and Informed Consent, supra, para. 46(i); Anaya
and Puig, supra, 23-24.
31 Report of the International Workshop on Methodologies Regarding Free Prior and Informed Consent, supra, para. 46(i); Anaya
and Puig, supra, 24.
32 For a contrary view regarding the requirement to obtain consent, see Anaya and Puig, supra, 2 and 18 (focusing on
FPIC as a duty for meaningful consultation, which acts as a balancing function to mitigate adverse impacts on the
human rights of indigenous peoples) and Former Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James
Anaya, Extractive industries and indigenous peoples, UN Doc. A/HRC/24/41 (1 July 2013), paras. 31-36 (discussing
exceptions to the general FPIC requirement).
33 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname. Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, (Ser. C) No. 172, para. 134; Centre for Minority Rights and Development & Others v Kenya (2009)
AHRLR 75, para. 291; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Indigenous peoples, Afro-descendent communities,
and natural resources: Human rights protection in the context of extraction, exploitation, and development activities (2016), 93; Report
of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, UN
Doc. E/CN.4/2003/90, (2003), para. 66; Emily Greenspan, The right to say “No”: Indigenous rights experts weigh in on
community consent (2015) (quoting Inter-American Commission on Human Rights chair Rose-Marie Belle Antoine and
United Nations special rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples Victoria Tauli-Corpuz).
34 U.N. Special Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect,
Respect and Remedy” Framework, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011), para. 18(b).
35 U.N. Special Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises, Principles for Responsible Contracts: Integrating the Management of Human Rights Risks into StateInvestor Contract Negotiations: Guidance for Negotiators, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31/Add.3 (2011), p. 24.
36 Forest Stewardship Council, FSC® International Standard, FSC Principles and Criteria for Forest Stewardship,
FSC-STD-01-001 V5-1 EN, Art. 4.8.
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Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Palm Oil Production37 set out FPIC requirements for all
relevant local communities for different aspects of forestry and palm oil concessions, respectively.
Individual food and beverage companies have also made overarching commitments to FPIC.38
Consultation and FPIC standards relating to contract negotiations
This paper seeks to develop ideas around the potential means of operationalizing consultation
and FPIC in the negotiation of investment contracts for natural resource projects. This is needed:
although several guidance highlight the need for consultation with, or informed participation of,
affected communities in the negotiation of investment contracts, none provide detailed guidance
on how this could be undertaken in practice. Moreover, while guidance documents exhort that
legitimate tenure right holders be included in project design or negotiations, they too do not
explain the mechanisms for how this would occur or the link to investor-state negotiations.
For example, one set of principles that provides some guidance specific to investment contracts
is the Principles for Responsible Contracts, which set out that “consultation with the affected
communities and individuals should take place before the contract is finalized.”39 These
Principles also emphasize the need for community engagement plans, but do not explore in great
detail the specific consultation and FPIC processes that could be employed for contract
negotiations. Similarly, the African Union’s Guiding Principles on Large Scale Land Based
Investments in Africa also assert that communities affected by large-scale land-based investment
should be “provided sufficient information, consulted on their views prior to finalizing [largescale land-based investment] agreements and [have] these views taken into consideration.”40 The
Voluntary Guidelines also note that “[a]ll forms of transactions in tenure rights as a result of
investments in land, fisheries and forests should be done transparently” and that “[c]ontracting
parties should provide comprehensive information to ensure that all relevant persons are engaged
and informed in the negotiations, and should seek that the agreements are documented and

Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil, Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Palm Oil Production (2007), Criteria 2.3, 7.5
and 7.6.
38 See, e.g., Coca-Cola Company, The Coca-Cola Company Commitment - Land Rights and Sugar (stating that “[t]he CocaCola Company will adhere to the principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent across our operations (including
bottling partners) and will require our suppliers to adhere to this principle.”), http://assets.cocacolacompany.com/6b/65/7f0d386040fcb4872fa136f05c5c/proposal-to-oxfam-on-land-tenure-and-sugar.pdf.
39 Principles for Responsible Contracts, supra, Principle 7, at 24.
40 African Union, African Development Bank and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Guiding
Principles on Large Scale Land Based Investments in Africa (2014), Principle 9, at 15. See also p. 13: “In order that decisions
on LSLBI respond to local and national development priorities, devolution of decision-making authority to
appropriate levels, meaningful participation by those affected by the investments in decision-making are required
along with transparency throughout the negotiation, approval, contracting and implementation process.”
37
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understood by all who are affected.”41 In addition, in 2009 the then-UN Special Rapporteur on
the right to food highlighted that it is “vital that the negotiations leading to [large-scale land
acquisitions and leases] comply with a number of procedural requirements ensuring informed
participation of the local communities.”42
Many other operational guidance documents also usefully stress the importance of including
affected communities and legitimate tenure right holders in negotiations for land-based
investments. The Guide to due diligence of agribusiness projects that affect land and property rights, prepared
by the Technical Committee on “Land Tenure and Development,” discusses pertinent
considerations in this regard, including whether local people were consulted and involved in
negotiations, whether the contract were made public, and whether local authorities or
representatives of local people were co-signatories to the contract, and whether local people were
invited to participate in the process of negotiating the contract and commenting on draft versions
of the contract.43 Other documents underline the importance of consultation and participation
but are vague regarding whether and how this should interact with investor-state negotiations
regarding such investments. For example, the USAID Operational Guidelines for Responsible LandBased Investment urge investors to “include in negotiations those who use or claim the land […],
even if their rights are not formally recognized.”44 Similarly, the New Alliance for Food Security
and Nutrition’s Analytical Framework for Land-Based Investments in African Agriculture notes that
investors should “[i]dentify those who legally own the land, as well as those who have other
legitimate rights over the land,” “[i]nclude both groups in negotiation, even if only legal owner
signs the contract,” and “[e]nsure that the entity or person signing the contract has legal authority
to do so.”45 These suggestions raise interesting questions regarding how to incorporate legitimate
right holders in negotiations, whether negotiating separate side agreements would suffice, and
what type of influence legitimate right holders might have in such processes if they are not
allowed to sign the contract.

FAO, Voluntary Guidelines On The Responsible Governance Of Tenure Of Land, Fisheries And Forests In The Context Of
National Food Security (2012), paras. 12.3, 12.11.
42 Prof. Oliver de Schutter, UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Largescale land acquisitions and leases: a set of
minimum principles and measures to address the human rights challenge (2009), 13.
43 Technical Committee on “Land Tenure and Development,” Guide to due diligence of agribusiness projects that affect land
and property rights (2014), 25-27, 61-63, http://www.foncier-developpement.fr/wp-content/uploads/Guide-to-duediligence.pdf.
44 Karol Boudreaux and Yuliya Neyman, USAID, Operational Guidelines for Responsible Land-Based Investment (2015), 37
45 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, Analytical Framework for Land-Based Investments in African Agriculture:
Due Diligence and Risk Management for Land-Based Investments in Agriculture (2015), 12.
41
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A proviso: consultation and FPIC processes must take place before authorization, and should be
iterative
While this paper focuses on modes of consultation and FPIC at the investment contract
negotiation stage of a project, it does not intend for such measures to constitute the full extent of
consultation and FPIC processes attached to an investment. Such an approach would undermine
consent and consultation standards, and is in tension with two key attributes regarding the timing
of consent and consultation processes.
First, only seeking to consult or obtain consent when an investment contract is being negotiated
would be too late in the process to comply with legal standards and best practices. Rather,
consultation and FPIC processes should commence prior to any authorization,46 and not only
when the need arises to obtain the community’s approval.47 In practice, a meaningfully
consultative and participatory process will entail informing and consulting with affected
communities, and when relevant obtaining their FPIC, before any permits are granted as well as
well before the negotiation of any investment contract. There are also practical reasons for why
this is important. As time passes, and investors spend more money on preparations for a project,
governments will face increasing pressure to approve the project, and may find it difficult to
require alterations or cessation of the project where local and public interests may be at risk. In
addition, communities who are only brought in at the stage of contract negotiations may struggle
to acquaint themselves with the project’s implications and to access funding, information, and
capacity support to meaningfully participate in negotiations. Thus, not engaging with the
community from the beginning may cause delays and create barriers to building consensus,
managing expectations, and obtaining the community’s social license to operate.48
Second, obtaining consent and consulting communities is not an obligation that can be fully and
finally satisfied at any one point in time; instead, consent and consultation processes should take
place regularly as part of “a continuous, iterative process of communication and negotiation
spanning the entire planning and project cycles.”49 Given the iterative nature of the consultation
and FPIC standards, a government’s obligations do not expire as soon as consent is obtained.50

Report of the International Workshop on Methodologies Regarding Free Prior and Informed Consent, supra, para. 46(i).
FAO, supra (2016), 15.
48 Anaya and Puig, supra, 12.
49 World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development: A new framework for decisionmaking (2000), 281,
https://www.internationalrivers.org/sites/default/files/attachedfiles/world_commission_on_dams_final_report.pdf.
50 Anaya and Puig, supra, 15.
46
47
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Continuous consent and consultation ensure a greater degree of participation and control for
communities, and improve communication between them and government and company
representatives; this helps to safeguard the human rights that underlie consent and consultation
requirements,51 potentially including rights to self determination, water, health, and food, among
others.
This paper’s consideration of consultation and FPIC at the contract negotiation stage will thus
only be relevant where: (i) the community has initially provided its FPIC to the project or to
being relocated sufficiently prior to contract negotiations; or (ii) where the government
permissibly determines that consent is not required, and discharges the burden of demonstrating
that no rights are being limited or affected or, if they are, that the limitation is permissible under
established international human rights law and “compl[ies] with certain standards of necessity and
proportionality with regard to a valid public purpose.”52 The instances in which a government can
make such a determination is a matter of unsettled debate and is not considered further in this
paper. Where such a determination is permissibly made, best practices still require robust
consultation processes prior to any authorization or commencement of activities; as such, the
options explored in this paper will still be relevant to such situations.
Consultation and FPIC in practice
Many communities have organized to articulate demands and advocate to governments and
companies regarding the shape that FPIC (and consultation) processes can take. Key to these
enactments has been a focus on FPIC as a means of community-driven decision-making and a
vehicle for self-determination;53 this emphasizes self-determination’s “internal aspect,” which

Anaya and Puig, supra, 14.
Former Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya, Extractive industries and indigenous
peoples, UN Doc. A/HRC/24/41 (1 July 2013), paras. 31-36; Anaya and Puig, supra, 27. Such a determination may
also need to be subject to independent judicial review: UN Doc. A/HRC/24/41, paras 39 and 87; FAO, Voluntary
Guidelines On The Responsible Governance Of Tenure Of Land, Fisheries And Forests In The Context Of National Food Security
(2012), para. 16.1. For examples of such limitations on consent and consultation requirements, see ILO C169, art.
16(2) (“Where the relocation of these peoples is considered necessary as an exceptional measure, such relocation
shall take place only with their free and informed consent. Where their consent cannot be obtained, such relocation
shall take place only following appropriate procedures established by national laws and regulations, including public
inquiries where appropriate, which provide the opportunity for effective representation of the peoples concerned”);
and UNDRIP, art. 46(2) (“The exercise of the rights set forth in this Declaration shall be subject only to such
limitations as are determined by law and in accordance with international human rights obligations. Any such
limitations shall be non-discriminatory and strictly necessary solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and
respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for meeting the just and most compelling requirements of a
democratic society.”).
53 Doyle and Cariño, supra, 15 and International Law Association, Resolution No. 5/2012: Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, section I, para. 5 (concluding that states are obliged by “customary and applicable convention international
51
52
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includes the “rights of all peoples to pursue freely their economic, social and cultural
development without outside interference.”54
One approach that communities have used to enact the right to self-determination has been the
development of community protocols, which set out culturally appropriate ways for external
actors to interact with a community, and processes for seeking to obtain its consent.55 Many
community protocols have been developed in anticipation of potential projects or events,
allowing the community to proactively set the agenda for how decisions regarding their lands and
resources will be made. Communities within the Indigenous reserve of Cañamono Lomapretia in
Colombia, for instance, developed a protocol that sets out detailed consultation procedures and
requirements that must take place prior to any administrative act, including the granting of
concessions and permissions for investment projects within the reserve.56 The protocol, while not
intended to only apply to extractive projects, goes so far as stating that the communities have
made a pre-determined decision to withhold consent for large-scale mining or mining that uses
cyanide or mercury.57 Other communities have developed protocols as a response to existing
impacts by extractives projects, setting rules and processes for ongoing or future projects.58 Such
protocols will be most effective when developed in advance of a project. They can also be
initiated at other stages of the investment project—to help communities build capacity and
organize, and to assist external actors to engage appropriately with the community—though they
won’t be able to ensure that the FPIC standard is complied with at the earliest stages of decisionmaking in such circumstances.59
In organizing to engage in FPIC and consultation processes, some communities have also sought
to democratize their representation. This has included developing processes for community
members to elect community liaison committees and any representatives participating in
negotiations with the host government and the investor.60 In other instances, communities have
law” to ensure FPIC and the rights to participation and consultation as a prerogative of the obligation to recognize
and promote the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy or self-government).
54 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 21, The right to self-determination
(Forty-eighth session, 1996), UN Doc. A/51/18, annex VIII (1996) at 125.
55 See, e.g., Doyle and Cariño, supra, 29-40; Jael Makagon et al, Balancing the Scales: Community Protocols and the Extractive
Industries – Lessons from Argentina, India, Kenya and Zimbabwe (2016),
https://za.boell.org/sites/default/files/balancing_the_scales.pdf; and Viviane Weitzner, “Dealing Full Force”: Lutsel
K’e Dene First Nation’s Experience Negotiating with Mining Companies (2006), 33-34.
56 Doyle and Cariño, supra, 28.
57 Doyle and Cariño, supra, 28.
58 Makagon et al, supra, 5-6.
59 Makagon et al, supra, 10.
60 Weitzner, supra, 7.
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used national and local legal frameworks to hold referenda regarding whether or not a proposed
project should be allowed to proceed.61
These efforts to organize and democratize community decision-making related to resource
investments can be complemented by best practice measures to ensure the views of different
subgroups of a community are adequately represented during consultation and FPIC processes.
While these different strategies for internal organization and preparations regarding incoming
investment projects will most effectively be invoked at the initial stages of decision-making
regarding the investment and before authorizations have been granted, they can also help with
decision-making regarding the question of community consultation regarding, or participation in,
investment contract negotiations.

Negotiating investment contracts
The negotiation process
Investors and host states enter into various types of contracts for natural resource projects; most
are negotiated before project operations begin. In addition to concluding contracts, an investor
will typically conduct feasibility studies, carry out scoping of the project’s potential environmental
or social impacts, and seek to obtain finance and the necessary permits needed for the project
under domestic law. Whether the investment contract is negotiated before or after these steps
will depend in large part on the domestic law and the purpose of the contract.
Investment contract negotiations differ in terms of length, and the number of negotiation
sessions and persons involved. In some cases, there can be multiple contracts between the same
parties for the one project: for example, the investor and the government might decide to
negotiate an investment incentives contract, a concession or lease agreement, and various side
agreements. (They also will often negotiate additional contracts with other actors—for example,
lenders that provide financing to the project, suppliers of goods and services necessary for
operations, and purchasers of crops produced/resources exploited.) In addition, parties may
subsequently renegotiate or amend relevant contracts based on changes in circumstances. The
time that a negotiation for any particular contract or set of contracts takes will depend on the
complexity of the project, and the extent to which those negotiating in the room have the
authority to sign off on commitments proposed, among other factors. In some cases—including
Brant McGee, “The Community Referendum: Participatory Democracy and the Right to Free, Prior and Informed
Consent to Development,” Berkeley Journal of International Law, Vol 27:2 (2009), 573.

61
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for some investment contracts regulating complex extractive projects62—negotiations can take
years; in other cases, negotiated agreements barely differ from investment contracts previously
negotiated in the country with other investors, potentially indicating that they were the result of a
much shorter negotiation period.
Negotiations themselves are unpredictable, as a government and investor might have widely
varying expectations for the contract. The style of negotiations can also vary depending on the
priorities of those participating and their ability to control the negotiation process. For instance,
negotiations can be “rents-based,” focusing on the “economic equilibrium of the contract,”
including the maximization of profits and the minimization of costs; alternatively, parties can
work towards an “interests-based” negotiation, where the negotiations seek to incorporate the
interests (financial and non-financial) of each party or stakeholder.63
Status quo: Inadequate consultation and FPIC processes
Governments and investors typically negotiate investment contracts without the knowledge,
consent, or participation of communities that stand to be affected by the investment. This will
usually fail to satisfy requirements for meaningful consultation and, when relevant, FPIC, given
the need for consultation and FPIC processes to be conducted iteratively, as discussed above.
Mere advance notification that there will be negotiations, and the provision of general
information about the proposed investment will also often be inadequate, unless opportunities
also exist for the community to communicate its perspective and influence the substance of
negotiations. Such an approach also fails to provide opportunity for communities to react to
unforeseen changes in negotiations.
A lack of community involvement in negotiations provokes additional concerns when the
contract requires the investor to subsequently negotiate a community development agreement
with the community, or to deliver social benefits: the community’s absence during the investment
contract negotiations may undermine its bargaining power in any subsequent community-investor
negotiations, as the parameters of the investment itself have already been set. In addition, the
absence of community input increases the risk that any local development requirements in the
David Kienzler et al, Natural Resource Contracts as a Tool for Managing the Mining Sector, 4 (“The agreement for the
Simandou iron ore project in Guinea took a number of years, in part due to negotiations over the 650km railway and
deep-sea port the project required and their availability for third-party access.”)
63 Carin Smaller et al, The IISD Guide to Negotiating Investment Contracts for Farmland and Water (2014), 12,
http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/iisd-guide-negotiating-investment-contracts-farmlandwater_1.pdf.
62
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investment contract will not be appropriately adjusted to the rights or priorities of the community,
and will instead be determined, and will be subject to trade-offs and compromise made, by
stakeholders less familiar with the community’s needs and with different agendas and priorities
than the community.
Will communities want to be involved?
In considering the potential for greater community participation and influence in investment
contract negotiations, the question arises: will communities even want to be involved? Given that
revenue sharing, local employment creation, and other benefits could be negotiated between the
community and the company directly in a separate agreement, why would communities be
interested in the negotiation of the overarching investment contract? While this will be for the
community to decide in each case, there are at least three potential advantages for community
members in participating in investment contract negotiations.
First, the substance of the investment contract will affect the operation of the investment, and its
impacts on local communities. Investment contracts cover issues pertinent to local communities,
including social and environmental protections, which can be designed to protect relevant
community interests and the resources on which communities rely; the concession’s boundaries
and size, which may have impacts on community members’ use of land and resources; and
company-reporting requirements on fiscal, environmental, and other issues, which provide an
important accountability mechanism. Fiscal reporting can also help communities monitor the
profitability of the project, which can be relevant to determining community entitlements
pursuant to revenue sharing arrangements, and can help to manage expectations regarding the
project’s viability more generally.
Investment contracts also often detail the specific business model that a project will take, which
in turn can affect the amount of revenue that will be shared with the community or the number
of local jobs created through a community development agreement, as well as more general
impacts on local land use, sources of livelihood, and the environment. Take, for instance, a recent
study of the oil palm and rubber operations of Sime Darby in Liberia. The report viewed the
company’s large-scale land concession model as “at a crossroads,”64 and detailed three potential
ways forward for the company to pursue: Scenario A involved developing the company’s full
Barbara Kuepper et al, Sime Darby: Liberian Crossroads (2016),
https://chainreactionresearch.files.wordpress.com/2014/02/sime-darby-161101-final.pdf.
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concession without obtaining FPIC of affected communities; Scenario B involved proceeding
with the investment but respecting buffer zones, obtaining FPIC, and preserving forests; and
Scenario C involved ceasing to expand the company’s own plantations and instead transitioning
to an outgrower model and relying on small-scale farmers.65 The potential variations in the
company’s business model for the project would also have very different impacts on local
communities. (Scenario A or B could also include additional outgrower commitments, in addition
to the larger plantation operations, which would potentially be of interest to the communities that
stand to be affected.) Given that a project’s business model is often outlined in an investment
contract, local communities might therefore wish to participate in investment contract
negotiations, to advocate for specific models that best meet their needs, and to warn against
models that may be particularly disruptive to the community.
Second, the community’s being able to influence the negotiation of investment contracts can also
create the opportunity to advocate for greater enforceability mechanisms for any related
community development agreement. Depending on the mode of consultation or consent,
communities could: advocate for the inclusion of a clause in the investment contract that deems
relevant company breaches of the community development agreement to constitute breaches of
the investment contract; advocate for clauses that make the community a third party beneficiary
with enforceable rights; or, where the community is to be a party to the investment contract,
potentially66 fold the substance of a community development agreement into the investment
agreement.
Third, building community consultation or FPIC into investment contract negotiations can help
to set the investor’s and government’s expectations regarding the degree to which the community
intends to participate throughout the life of the project. This can encourage strict company
compliance with the obligations included in the contract as well as providing a stronger basis for
future requests from the community for meetings or the disclosure of project-related information.
The increased exposure to company and government representatives may also serve to empower
community members, enabling them to understand those representatives’ motivations and
perspectives and increasing their ability to influence decision-making.

Kuepper et al, 1 and 10-12.
Further research would be needed to fully understand the potential benefits and drawbacks of having only one
agreement that acts as both a tripartite investment contract and a community development agreement.
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Modes of consultation and FPIC for investment contract negotiations
This section starts with a discussion of the importance of the community having influence over
how it will participate in contract negotiations, before detailing factors that will affect how
communities can participate and influence decision-making regarding investment contract
negotiations in any particular case. It then explores three proposed alternative options for
building consultation and FPIC into investment contract negotiations, analyzing the benefits and
challenges that each option offers for fostering meaningful participation and creating
opportunities for communities to influence the outcomes of the contract.
Ensuring that the community has a say
The decision as to which mode of consultation or consent is most appropriate will vary from case
to case, and should correspond with the community’s expressed preference. The government
should thus consult with the community regarding how it should participate in investment
contract negotiations, taking into account the community’s internal organization and decisionmaking structures.67 Such an approach is especially important for indigenous communities and
ethnic minorities, whose right to self-determination extends to having the right to pursue freely
their economic, social and cultural development without outside interference.68 Consultation on
the question of participation should also include opportunities for representatives of marginalized
subgroups to contribute their perspective.
Key to any mode of community participation will be the allocation of sufficient resources and
time for the community to prepare itself to be able to decide on its preferred mode of
participation, to adequately prepare and decide on key priorities within the community, and then
to meaningfully participate. This may require capacity building—potentially on topics including
contract negotiations, human rights, the type of project proposed, internal decision-making,
representation and consultation with different subgroups, and so on—as well as access to legal

Ute Dieckmann and Ben Begbie-Clench, “Chapter 19: Consultation, Participation and Representation,” in Ute
Dieckmann et al, “Scraping the Pot”: San in Namibia two decades after independence (2014), 597-598 (noting the discussion
by the ILO’s Senior Specialist on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Issues, Dr Albert Barume, of the need for
“Designing with the participation of indigenous peoples the consultation and participation framework and
mechanism [...] (consultation on consultation)”).
68 UNDRIP, arts. 3-4; Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 21, The right to
self-determination (Forty-eighth session, 1996), UN Doc. A/51/18, annex VIII (1996) at 125, para. 4 (referring to the
right to self-determination’s “internal aspect”).
67
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and other support, and access to sufficient information regarding the proposed project in a form
that it can understand.69
Factors affecting increased community involvement in investment contract negotiations
This subsection considers different factors that may affect how, or the degree to which, a
community can be more closely involved in the negotiation of an investment contract. The
government should be strongly influenced by the community’s stated preference for the mode of
their inclusion in the investment contracting stage. In practice, however, the government’s
obligations to comply with human rights law requirements for consultation and FPIC may be in
tension with its investment promotion objectives, which often create pressures to attract
investors, including by streamlining the processes needed for investors to be granted concessions
and authorizations. While noting that such factors do not provide a legal grounds for failing to
comply with requirements for consultation and FPIC, including at the investment contract
negotiation stage, it is useful to consider how the perspectives of both the government and the
investor can affect the applicability or likelihood of different modes of community consultation
and FPIC in practice.
The political and economic context may encourage greater community involvement in
negotiations. For instance, state-level authorities from Southern Sudan reportedly faced some
political pressure to meaningfully involve the Tindilo community in investment contract
negotiations with Tree Farms Sudan Ltd., given that a recent peace agreement included a
statement—which also happened to be the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement’s slogan—that
the “land belongs to the community.”70 Similarly, where the government is willing to increase
community involvement but the investor is reluctant, the government may be able to leverage
existing conditions, such as favorable economic conditions for the project, tight timelines, or the
fact that certain permits have not yet been granted.71 In addition, piloting efforts to increase
See Weintz, supra, 1, for an example of peer-to-peer sharing: the document was prepared by the Lutsel K’e Dene
First Nation as “a direct response to a request from the Association of Indigenous Village Leaders of Suriname
(VIDS) for Canadian Indigenous People to provide capacity-building support to communities in West Suriname who
will be affected by proposed open-pit, large-scale bauxite mining by BHP Billiton and Suralco, large-scale hydroelectric development by Suralco, and a nature reserve proposed by the Government of Suriname and the World
Wildlife Fund.”
70 Center for Human Rights and Global Justice (CHRGJ), Foreign Land Deals and Human Rights: Case Studies on
Agricultural and Biofuel Investment (2010), 48 (at footnote 349) and 51.
71 See, e.g., Natasha Affolder, “Rethinking Environmental Contracting,” Journal of Environmental Law and Practice, Vol.
21 (2010), 164 (discussing the Canadian government’s strategy for including Aboriginal communities in some
contractual negotiations for the Ekati Diamond Mine). Although O’Faircheallaigh also notes that the national and
territorial government parties were “determined that development of Ekati should not be prevented or substantially
delayed”: Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, Negotiations in the Indigenous World (2015), Chapter 8.
69
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community participation in negotiations may lead to expectations for improved community
consultation in future negotiations. For instance, community participation in environmental
contract negotiations for the Ekati Diamond Mine “crystallized expectations about the degree of
Aboriginal participation in environmental agreements for major Canadian projects,” making it
“virtually impossible to return to a process of closed negotiations between governments and
project proponents in this region.”72 On the other hand, in country contexts where corruption is
prevalent, corrupt actors may view community participation as a threat to their illicit dealings and
may seek to ensure they are excluded from the negotiation table.
Investors seeking to obtain social license to operate in the area may also be receptive to
enabling the community to more meaningfully participate in decision-making and contract
negotiations. For instance, in the abovementioned Tree Farms Sudan example, a company
representative stressed that the long-term nature of the project meant that the company needed
“a local community who looks upon the project as their property, so they can guard and protect
the plantation themselves.”73 Additionally or alternatively, the investor may face pressures from
its headquarters office or parent company to engage in international best practices. One example
of this concerned the participation by Aboriginal representatives in negotiations between the
Government of the Northwest Territories of Canada and a diamond mining company regarding
both an Environmental Agreement and a Socio-Economic Agreement for the Ekati Diamond
Mine. A representative from the company noted that by engaging in such a process, the company
sought to maintain its parent company’s interest in the project which was at risk of waning
because of a slow and costly permitting phase: “We had to keep it sexy and interesting for [the
parent company. …] We used words like ‘sustainable development.’ They liked that stuff.”74
Other actors—such as financiers or development organizations seeking to partner with investors
on a project—could also theoretically influence an investor’s willingness to support community
participation in negotiations by requiring greater community inclusion as a condition of their
support or cooperation.
Another factor that may also add to pressures for community inclusion is the domestic legal
framework in place, including laws, court decisions, and any treaties or other instruments of
settlement between the government and communities regarding claims to indigenous or
customary lands and resources. For instance, a tripartite investment contract for a Pooling and
Affolder, supra, 169.
CHRGJ, supra, 52
74 Affolder, supra, 164.
72
73
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Sharing Joint Venture between the South African government, the government-owned Alexkor
diamond mining company, and a corporate vehicle established and controlled by members of the
Richtersveld community75 was entered into pursuant to a deed of settlement between the
government and the community following the community’s successful court claims to ancestral
lands and resources.76 The Tindilo community’s reported participation in negotiations regarding
the Tree Farms investment contract, discussed above, also may have been slightly bolstered by
recently enacted land legislation which set out, albeit in undetailed terms, that administration of
the country’s land shall be based on principles including participation and transparency.77
Having considered various factors that may affect the likelihood or feasibility of building
improved modes of consultation or FPIC into investment contract negotiations, this paper now
explores three proposed options for doing so.
Option one: Periodic consultations during negotiations
A basic option for increasing meaningful consultation with potentially affected communities in
the context of negotiations, and for providing further iterative consent processes, is to ensure
that any relevant investor-state negotiation process includes sufficient opportunities to undertake
multiple consultations and obtain consent as necessary, which are based on an informed
understanding of negotiations to date and that in turn influence continued negotiations. Under
this option, a government and investor that plan to conduct negotiations in the absence of
community representatives and civil society organizations would conduct negotiations in
“rounds,” with corresponding community consultations and consent processes taking place
between each round, based on the latest draft version of the contract. Negotiating rounds could
be set at the outset; in addition, rules could be determined to enable (or require) either party to
halt contract negotiations to report back to, and gather input from, the community, if
negotiations touch on key issues identified by the community beforehand.

See Lorenzo Cotula, Investment Contracts and Sustainable Development: How to Make Contractors for Fairer and More
Sustainable Natural Resource Investments (2010), 28 (Box 3); James Gathii and Ibironke T Odumosu-Ayanu, “The Turn
to Contractual Responsibility in the Global Extractive Industry,” Business and Human Rights Journal, Vol. 1 (2015), 91;
Research Unit of the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, Alexkor: Richtersveld Community and the Pooling and
Sharing Joint Venture (PSJV), (2016) http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/161012alexkorr.pdf.
76 Alexkor Ltd and the Republic of South Africa v the Richtersveld Community & Others (CCT19/03) [2003] ZACC 18 (South
African Constitutional Court), para. 62; Richtersveld Community & Others v Alexkor Ltd & Another 2003 6 BCLR 583
(South African Supreme Court of Appeal), para. 18.
77 CHRGJ, supra, 51.
75
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To maximize the degree to which communities are able to participate, such processes could
involve local public meetings that would allow for consultation with members of the community,
as well as their representatives, and local civil society groups. As for any consultation process,
specific strategies may be needed to facilitate the meaningful participation of marginalized
subgroups of the community, such as ensuring meetings are convened at accessible times,
convening separate meetings for different subgroups, and providing for appropriate translation
into local languages. Radio, SMS, and other communications technology could be used to share
information and publicize meetings. Where appropriate, online contract repositories could also
be used to publish draft versions of contracts, along with resources that make it easier for
affected persons and their advisers to understand the implications of the draft contract and to
formulate their subsequent submissions to the negotiating parties.78
Where there are credible concerns regarding the sensitivity of information contained within the
contract, consultations could be conducted with a lightly redacted version of the draft agreement.
Alternatively, consultations could take place solely with community representatives and local civil
society groups on a confidential basis, on the understanding that information of a general nature
would then be the subject of more widespread consultations with community members. Another
alternative in such circumstances would be to adopt a process similar to the U.S. government’s
consultation process around trade treaties, which involves providing information to, and seeking
comment from, multi-stakeholder advisory committees before and during the negotiation of such
treaties.79 In a local community context, consultative committees could include representatives
from any traditional community decision-making structures as well as members of subgroups
such as women, religious minorities, youth, workers, and so on, as well as representatives from
civil society organizations that support them.
The likelihood of governments and investors agreeing to community demands for this option
may be bolstered by the fact that this option shares some features with existing consultation
processes, and provides avenues to protect sensitive information. Negotiators may, however, be
reluctant to halt negotiations when they have gained momentum; mechanisms would be needed
to ensure that the breaks between negotiation rounds are sufficiently long, and can be periodically
For example, OpenLandContracts.org hosts investment contracts between investors and host governments
relating to agriculture and forestry investments; each contract is accompanied by plain language summaries of the
contract’s key social, environmental, fiscal, and operational provisions: http://OpenLandContracts.org.
ResourceContracts.org provides a similar platform for oil, gas and mining contracts: http://ResourceContracts.org.
79 “A Note on Stakeholder Consultation,” Tradewinds: The official blog of the United States Trade Representative (2014),
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/blog/2014/February/a-note-on-stakeholder-consultation
78

Page 24

Provisional draft – Not for citation or attribution

triggered, to ensure the community has ample opportunity to follow developments and offer its
perspective.

Opportunities and challenges
This option deepens consultations with communities beyond mere one-off ex ante consultations,80
by providing the community with regular updates on negotiations and, if carried out meaningfully,
providing opportunities for community members to influence and shape negotiations. The lack
of community or civil society presence at negotiations, however, renders community members
reliant on other actors to stay updated on the progress of negotiations. Absence from the
negotiating table also limits the community’s ability to shape the agenda of contract negotiations
and to ensure that their concerns are adequately reflected in the structure and substance of the
investment contract. Any restrictions on a community’s access to the draft agreement would also
significantly undermine its ability to participate meaningfully, given the importance of the
wording of contract clauses.
Another challenge with this approach would be ensuring that breaks between negotiation rounds
allowed a sufficient amount of time to enable the consultation to take place meaningfully. This
may be hard to achieve when negotiations move quickly unless clear criteria for triggering a break
in negotiations are set out. Yet negotiating timetables may not allow for adequate consultation
with communities. Even when a community has a representative in the room, the involvement of
different segments of the community may be limited because of time pressures faced by the
investor or company, as community elders found in the Ekati Diamond Mine negotiations.81 This
highlights the even greater difficulties that non-represented communities may face.
Overall, this option holds some potential for improving consultation processes at the negotiation
stage, by ensuring that communities are aware of developments and, potentially, can voice
concerns and shape negotiations while they take place (though this will depend on the degree to
which either party to the negotiations accurately reports back to the community and allows for

For an example of the shortcomings of solely conducting ex ante consultations in the extractive industries context,
see Kienzler, supra, 45 (“A civil society representative noted that the government engaged with them in advance of
negotiations for a mining agreement. However, despite the CSO’s efforts to have local communities included in the
actual negotiations, they were not consulted in any way during talks, nor did the government or the company come
back after the deal was completed to inform the people what was agreed to.”)
81 Weitzner, supra, 13 (“‘When the negotiation was happening, the Elders weren’t informed until it was too late,’ one
Elder said. ‘But even though when the negotiators came back to the Elders to give them information, it was already
processed. They were informed, but then it was too late. And the government was already ahead with the mines.’”).
80
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community perspectives to influence negotiations). The option is less attractive as a means of
ensuring FPIC: while communities may be more “informed,” and while such processes would
take place “prior” to the contract being finalized, the degree to which any consent is “free” may
be undermined by the lack of opportunity, to consider alternative options unless the option of
withholding consent and effectively vetoing the project remains on the table.
Option two: Community participation in negotiations, as a non-party
A second option for improved consultation and FPIC at the contract negotiation stage involves
community representatives being present at, and directly participating in, investment contract
negotiations, but not actually signing the agreement as a contractual party. Contracting parties
would determine the exact boundaries of the community representatives’ participation in
negotiations. The degree to which the community’s representatives were able to participate would
also be influenced by their ability and willingness to follow and participate in discussions, and
may also be affected by the attitudes of the government and company negotiators. Under such an
arrangement, community representatives may need time and resources for capacity building and
preparation, as well as ongoing support, for example, from an adequately trained interpreter and,
potentially, from legal advisors or civil society allies. Community representatives would also
benefit from reserving the right to put negotiations on hold if more time is needed to consult
with their community members to obtain input on unexpected proposals or developments.
Representatives of communities and civil society organizations have already participated in
negotiations with host governments and investors in ways similar to the approach outlined in this
option. Examples include: the aforementioned reported inclusion of the Tindilo community in
negotiations for an investment contract for the Tree Farms Sudan tree plantation and forestry
conservation project in Southern Sudan (which had an annexed Community Support Program
agreement between the community and the government);82 the participation by Aboriginal
representatives in contractual negotiations for the Ekati Diamond Mine, also discussed above;83
and Afghanistan EITI’s presence as an observer of investment contract negotiations for an
extractive project.84
The exact mechanism for determining who will represent the community at negotiations will vary.
While traditional councils or decision-making structures may be appropriate, these should be
CHRGJ, supra, 16.
Weitzner, supra, 6; Affolder, supra, 156; O’Faircheallaigh, supra, Chapter 8.
84 Kienzler, supra, 45.
82
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supplemented by representatives from relevant subgroups as needed to ensure all perspectives are
represented.85 Also, as noted under option one, above, it will still be vital for community
representatives to regularly report back to, and consult with, community members regarding the
negotiations to ensure community members remain informed and can offer their opinions on
new developments.
Despite not being a formal party to any investment contract negotiated under this option,
communities can use their participation in negotiations to bolster the enforceability of related
community-investor or community-government agreements, which can be referenced in, or
annexed to, the investment contract between the investor and the state. For instance, the
Community Support Program agreement for the Tindilo community is referenced in the
investment contract for that project.86 Communities can also seek to include third party
beneficiary clauses in the investment contract,87 though it is not yet common for such clauses to
be created to the benefit of affected communities in investment contracts. Such clauses could
identify the community as having enforceable rights under the investment contract—for instance,
regarding investor obligations to protect the environment or avoid human rights impacts.88
Opportunities and challenges
This option would immediately increase the community’s access to information regarding the
negotiations, and would provide another forum for community representatives to communicate
and share their perspectives with the government and the investor. Being in the negotiation room
also creates more opportunities for community representatives to influence negotiations—both
substantively and, if negotiations are proceeding too quickly or if a break is needed to allow for
further consultation with community members, procedurally.
For instance, during the negotiations for the Ekati Diamond Mine, the Lutsel K’e Dene’s council represented that
community in negotiations, resulting in youth groups and Elders feeling that their views were not sufficiently
represented: Weitzner, supra, 12-3.
86 Land Title Agreement between Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry, Central Equatoria State and Tree Farms Sudan
Ltd., 2008, Art 4.6, available at Open Land Contracts, http://www.openlandcontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf2526678534/view#/pdf/page/2/annotation/24035.
87 In the agricultural context, see, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding between the Sierra Leone Ministry of
Agriculture, Forestry and Food Security, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Ministry of Trade and
Industry, and Sierra Land Development Ltd., 2013, Art. 6, Appendix, Arts. 10-11 (Granting third party beneficiary
rights to the investor’s shareholders, contractors and subcontractors with regard to a stabilization clause and a clause
prohibiting nationalization and expropriation).
http://www.openlandcontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-2317427356/view#. In the extractive industries context,
see, e.g., Mineral development agreement between the government of the republic of Liberia, Western Cluster
Limited, Sesa Goa Limited, Bloom Fountain Limited, and Elenilto Minerals & Mining LLC, 2011, Art. 27.9
(Granting third party beneficiary rights to the investors’ shareholders to invoke mediation and arbitration rights),
http://resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-6207349867/view#/pdf.
88 International Senior Lawyers Project and Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, Guide to Land Contracts:
Forestry Projects (2017), 8, http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2017/01/GuidetoLandContracts-ForestryProjects.pdf.
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The principal challenge of this option is that the community’s ability to influence negotiations
might be undermined by the fact that it is not a formal party to the agreement. Not being a party
means that there is no guarantee that the community will be able to shape what is agreed upon.
This approach creates the potential for improved consultation, given that community
representatives will be more informed regarding the direction negotiations take, and will be wellplaced to seek to influence negotiations as they take place. It also can contribute to ensuring
communities are informed, as required by FPIC requirements. However, to the extent that
communities risk having their views ignored during negotiations this option may struggle to be an
adequate instantiation of meaningful consultation or FPIC.
Option three: Including the community as a party / Tripartite investment contracts
A third option for improved consultation and FPIC at the contract negotiation stage would
involve the community being a party to the investment contract, making the contract a tripartite89
or “multi-actor”90 investment contract, with the host government, the investor, and the local
community (or communities) as parties. The contract would set out the government’s and
investor’s obligations with regard to the investment as it normally would in an investor contract.
Depending on how the contract is structured, the community could obtain enforceable rights to
hold either actor to account if they were in breach of the contract.
Examples of other types of tripartite contracts between governments, investors, and affected
communities exist, but only provide a limited insight into what a tripartite investment contract
would include and how it would operate in practice. Mozambique requires mining companies to
enter into tripartite memoranda of understanding with the government and certain families or
communities who may face resettlement, with such memoranda detailing the amount of
compensation the company will pay to those families or communities.91 Tripartite agreements
have been negotiated in Canada, also in the context of extractive industries. For instance, a socioeconomic agreement for the Diavik Diamonds Project was entered into between the investor
(Diavik Diamond Mines Inc., owned by Rio Tinto), the government of the Northwest Territories
Boudreaux and Neyman, supra, pp. 37-38;
Ibironke T. Odumosu-Ayanu, Governments, Investors and Local Communities: Analysis of a Multi-Actor
Investment Contract Framework, Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol 15(2) (2014) (hereafter “Odumosu-Ayanu,
MJIL”); Ibironke T. Odumosu-Ayanu, “Multi Actor Contracts, Competing Goals and Regulation of Foreign
Investment,” University of New Brunswick Law Journal, Vol 65 (2014) (hereafter “Odumosu-Ayanu, UNBLJ”).
91 Mining Law No. 20/2014 (Mozambique), Art. 30.
89
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of Canada, and five aboriginal signatories,92 some of whom were involved in the Ekati Diamond
Mine negotiations. The agreement focuses on benefit sharing, including employment creation,
and environmental monitoring, and was used as the basis for five subsequent individual
participation agreements with each aboriginal signatory.93 A second example comes from the
same Canadian territory; the Snap Lake environmental agreement has as its parties the
Government of Canada, the Government of the Northwest Territories, the investor (De Beers
Canada Mining Inc.), and four aboriginal signatories.94 The agreement focused on environmental
management. While both agreements detail important processes and mechanisms ancillary to the
project—the Diavik agreement sets up an advisory board and details the company’s benefit
sharing commitments, while the Snap Lake agreement establishes an environmental monitoring
agency to be established by the aboriginal signatories—neither cover the full range of issues
usually included in investment contracts. Finally, the Pooling and Sharing Joint Venture between
the South African government, Alexkor (a government-owned company), and a corporate vehicle
for the Richtersveld community is an example of a tripartite investment contract, albeit of a very
unique character. The agreement reportedly sees the two corporate parties pooling their marine
and land mining rights and having equal representation on the Joint Board, with Alexkor entitled
to a 51% share in the joint venture, and the community’s company entitled to the remaining
49%.95 This agreement has been noted to arise from unique factors, including a landmark court
ruling in favor of the community, the community’s legal ownership of mining rights, and
significant government assistance and cooperation.96
Communities with prior experience with formal negotiations—such as indigenous communities
that may have negotiated treaties with governments or community development agreements with
companies—will be especially well placed to embark upon this mode of participation.97 It has also

Socio-Economic Monitoring Agreement between Diavik Diamond Mines Inc., The Government of the Northwest
Territories, Dogrib Treaty 11 Council, Lutsel K’e Dene Band, North Slave Métis Alliance, Yellowknives Dene First
Nation, and Kitikmeot Inuit Association (1999), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/01/Canada-NorthwestTerritories-and-Aboriginal-Peoples-Diavik-Diamond-Mines-1999-Agreement.pdf.
93 Richard Missens et al, “Aboriginal partnerships in Canada: focus on the Diavik Diamond Mine,” Journal of
Enterprising Communities: People and Places in the Global Economy, Vol. 1 No. 1 (2007), 56-57.
94 Environmental agreement between the Government of Canada, the Government of the Northwest Territories, De
Beers Canada Mining Inc., Dogrib Treaty 11 Council, Lutsel K’e Dene Band, Yellowknives Dene First Nation, and
North Slave Métis Alliance (2007), http://www.slema.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/De-Beers-FinalEnvironmental-Agreement-PDF1.pdf.
95 Cotula, supra, 28 (Box 3).
96 Cotula, supra, 28 (Box 3).
97 See Affolder, supra, 164 (“Why did this agreement happen at Ekati? Local Aboriginal groups were effective
negotiators, with the legal and technical capacity to negotiate the agreements. One company official described the
Aboriginal negotiators involved as ‘the best negotiators in the world’ given their decades-long experience with land
claims negotiations.”)
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been suggested that tripartite contracts may be more likely to work where there is a “special need
for cooperation,” a manageable number of contractual parties, and an expectation of
cooperation—and not strategic stalling or opposition—towards reaching an agreement.98

Opportunities and challenges
Provided the project-affected community would have adequate time and access to sufficient
resources, capacity building, and technical support, this option would strengthen the community’s
opportunity to be meaningfully consulted on, and to influence and potentially consent to, the
exact parameters of the investment contract eventually agreed upon. Opportunities for
communities to set the agenda of negotiations and exercise leverage over decision-making
regarding the project’s design are generally rare.99 This option provides a genuine opportunity to
do so, and may lead to investment contracts that minimize the adverse impacts of, and potentially
leverage the benefits of, the investment projects.100 Close participation in negotiations can also
help to set expectations regarding the degree to which the community may wish to have a regular
line of communication with the company and to be involved in future decision-making regarding
the project when community members’ rights may be affected—potentially including in the
design of any resettlement plans and water management plans.
Tripartite contracts could also give the community rights to enforce the contract in the event of
breaches of obligations by the government or investor. It would mean the community would
have enforceable contractual rights against both the government and the investor once
negotiations have been finalized, and that any “benefits” or local development projects that an
investor is required to undertake are established in the context of full awareness of the
community’s stated priorities, and its ability to enforce them. Linking clauses important for the
community to the validity of permissions for carrying out the investment—which is of supreme
importance to the investor—could give the community more leverage to enforce its entitlements
and hold the investor to account (though such clauses may be very difficult to achieve during
negotiations). In addition, the prospect of an enforceable contract may also increase the
likelihood that the company and government partners will properly engage with community
Meinhard Doelle, “Regulating the Environment by Mediation and Contract Negotiation: A Case Study of the
Dona Lake Agreement,” Journal of Environmental Law and Practice Vol. 2 (1992), 212; referred to in Odumosu-Ayanu,
UNBLJ, supra, 304.
99 Affolder, supra, 173-4.
100 The presence of organized community members could also assist governments with low capacity who may not
have the expertise or the political motivation to ensure that each aspect of the contract is sufficiently considered and
adapted to the needs of the country and the local community.
98
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proposals during negotiations, thereby bolstering the degree to which the community can
participate and drive decision-making.
In common law jurisdictions, the community, by being a party to the contract, may also be able
to invoke a rich body of contract law protections that are aimed at addressing inequality of
bargaining power between the parties, including protections against unconscionable conduct,
misrepresentation, undue influence, or duress.101 These protections echo FPIC requirements that
consent and consultation be “free,” and may thus provide an additional means of enforcing FPIC
and consultation rights. The availability of these protections could also create an additional
incentive to the government and company to ensure that the principles of FPIC are complied
with during the investment contract negotiation stage.
Challenges remain with this option. In many instances, the community will face power
imbalances, which can only be partially mitigated, rather than alleviated, by capacity building,
advice, sufficient time and resources to prepare, and the promise of contractual law protections.
Companies may seek to “buy off” the community’s resistance.102 This option would also require a
degree of cooperation and inclusiveness afforded by the government that has so far proven very
rare. Further, questions remain as to how low-capacity governments, which may already struggle
to negotiate advantageous investment contracts, would manage with a third party in the room.
In addition, community members participating in negotiations have reported many adverse
impacts in doing so, including stress and consultation fatigue, as well as disputes within the
community and with other communities regarding the amount and allocation of financial
benefits.103 There also is no guarantee that communities empowered to participate in negotiations
will be able to successfully negotiate agreements that meet community concerns.104 Despite these
challenges, the prospect of tripartite investment contracts creates real possibilities for effectively
building FPIC and consultation into investment contract negotiations.

Odumosu-Ayanu, MJIL, supra, 27; Gathii and Odumosu-Ayanu, supra, 71.
Affolder, supra, 173-174; Weitzner, supra, 11.
103 Weitzner, supra, 16-18.
104 Researchers studying the Tindilo community’s involvement in negotiations noted that the resulting agreements
were lopsided and written in “remarkably vague terms”: CHRGJ, supra, 56 and 54. Similarly, community members
from Lutsel K’e Dene noted that the agreement negotiated “had some serious flaws”: Weitzner, supra, 29.
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Conclusion
Government obligations with regard to consultation and FPIC are designed to enable
communities to exercise a greater degree of influence over decision-making regarding the use of
their lands and resources, and can also ensure greater protection of other human rights of
affected communities in the context of natural resource investments. Yet in practice, these
standards are rarely carried out adequately, despite important innovations by communities and
civil society allies. Investment contract negotiations are one stage of the investment process that
is relatively unexplored, and where current consultation or FPIC processes conducted by
governments and investors are almost always inadequate. This paper has sought to highlight this
deficiency and propose different options for how these standards could be met at the investment
contract negotiation stage. In doing so it has considered the dynamic nature of contract
negotiations and the various challenges that communities seeking to be more closely involved in
such a technical process may encounter. The options in this paper remain relatively untested, and
many questions deserve further attention. They will also not usually be relevant or of interest to
communities who oppose a proposed investment, and may be met with resistance from public or
corporate actors. In other cases, however, the options discussed can provide stakeholders
involved in natural resource investments with ideas for strategies to improve practices with
regard to investment contract negotiations; such options are intended to lead to improved
communication and information sharing between stakeholders, greater influence and
empowerment for communities, and ultimately to decision-making around investments that is
compliant with human rights law and responsive to community needs and concerns.
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